Research
Peer-reviewed Articles
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. (2026) Surviving Political Disruption: Renomination Patterns of Former Party of Regions Deputies in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine. Electoral Studies, 102, 103113.
Major political disruptions often discredit ruling parties, but they do not necessarily eliminate the political influence of politicians formerly associated with them. This article examines how former regional deputies of Ukraine’s Party of Regions (PoR) survived politically after the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution. Although the revolution discredited the PoR and removed it from national power, approximately one-third of former PoR regional deputies were renominated in the subsequent 2015 regional legislative elections. I explain this pattern by focusing on the interaction between former PoR deputies seeking viable electoral vehicles and parties seeking candidates with local mobilizational capacity. I argue that three factors shaped renomination prospects in post-Euromaidan Ukraine: individual electoral resources, ideological embeddedness in the PoR, and political geography. Deputies with stronger personal electoral resources, proxied by victory in majoritarian races, were more likely to be renominated, especially by the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko (BPP), the new ruling party. Deputies more deeply embedded in the PoR were less likely to join the BPP but more likely to align with the Opposition Bloc (OB), the PoR’s successor. Former PoR deputies were also more likely to survive in regions where the OB retained support and in rural areas characterized by shallow elite pools and clientelistic networks. Using original data on deputies elected in 2010 and candidates in Ukraine’s 2015 regional elections, this study shows how local electoral resources and party-side demand enabled the political survival of discredited PoR members in post-Euromaidan Ukraine.
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. (2026) Legitimacy and Control: The Strategic Use of Minor Opposition Parties in Authoritarian Elections. Comparative Politics, Fast Track.
Why do authoritarian regimes tolerate minor opposition parties with little chance of winning power? This article argues that such parties persist because regimes deliberately structure political competition. Minor opposition parties enhance regime stability through two mechanisms. First, they boost electoral legitimacy by broadening political choice and sustaining the appearance of competition without threatening control. Second, they reduce electoral uncertainty by fragmenting opposition support, imitating major challengers, and occupying ideological niches. Focusing on Russia after the 2012 party registration reform, which sharply increased the number of parties, the analysis draws on an original dataset of 367 regional legislative elections (2003–2024). It shows that minor parties are more prevalent in politically vulnerable regions, increase turnout, weaken stronger opposition forces, and reinforce authoritarian resilience.
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. (2023) Integrating Governor Posts Into the Federal Bureaucratic Structure: Resignation and Post-Tenure Careers of Governors in Russia. Europe-Asia Studies, 75(10), 1651–1676.
Authoritarian leaders incorporate key subnational posts into state bureaucratic structures to consolidate their regimes. Exploiting a comprehensive dataset of post-tenure careers of governors in Russia, this study demonstrates that under the centralisation reforms of the Putin presidency, governors have left their posts at the discretion of the federal government. In the 2010s, outgoing governors frequently faced criminal charges. At the same time, an increasing number of governors have been promoted to federal government posts, and regional posts have been incorporated into the federal administrative structure through a combination of tight control and promotions.
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. (2023) Growing Localization and Fragmentation of Patronal Politics: Ukrainian Local Elections since 2010. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 64(3), 296–321.
Ukraine’s 2020 local elections showed a radical transformation of the party system through the proliferation of local parties. While extant studies have examined the gradual nationalization of the party system, the rapid increase in party system localization, as observed in present-day Ukraine, has rarely been discussed. Combining qualitative evidence on the 2010s’ political processes and quantitative evidence from data analysis of Ukraine’s local election results in 2010, 2015, and 2020, this study demonstrates that party system localization was caused by influential mayors who rapidly accumulated power after the Euromaidan. This increase in mayoral authority has three main causes. First, institutional settings such as popular mayoral elections and the relative autonomy of city governments in the state structure provide mayors with unique powers at odds with other regional actors, such as the governors. Second, the decentralization reform initiated after the Euromaidan empowered mayors and city governments. Finally, Volodymyr Zelens’kyi’s recruitment pattern of governors and his party Servant of the People’s candidate selection process enabled mayors to cultivate their local power bases. This study offers an important implication for the idea of patronalism by indicating the geographical fragmentation of patronal politics.
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. (2022) Remnants of the Ancien Régime: Renomination and Re-election of Former Members of A Demised Ruling Party in Ukraine. Democratization, 29(7), 1249–1267.
Although much scholarly attention has recently been devoted to authoritarian successor parties, most existing studies have not empirically examined the survival patterns of former elite cadres of overthrown regimes. This study explores the conditions under which members of former ruling parties survive in the elections that follow the collapse of authoritarian regimes. Exploiting the comprehensive data of 450 incumbents of the national legislature and 2869 incumbents of the regional legislatures in Ukraine, this study examines the survival of the former members of a collapsed ruling party, the Party of Regions (PoR), and demonstrates that former PoR deputies with individual resources, such as those elected in single-member districts, were more likely to secure seats in the subsequent elections. Additionally, electoral calculations prevailed over political programmes or ideologies in terms of party affiliations of former PoR deputies. These findings highlight the importance of individual resources of ex-members of authoritarian ruling parties in political survival.
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. (2019) The Electoral Logic of Governor Rotations in Ukraine: Rulers’ Authority, Party Strength, and Regional Polarization. Post-Soviet Affairs, 35(3), 258–276.
How and under what conditions do authoritarian rulers use the state apparatus to help ensure victory? To answer this question, this paper examines electoral mobilization as a rationale for the appointment of governors in hybrid regimes. Given their absolute authority to use administrative resources, autocratic rulers prefer governors who can perform well in mobilizing the electorate in their favor. However, several circumstances make this strategy suboptimal or impossible. To provide empirical evidence supporting this argument, this study conducts a survival analysis using an original dataset of gubernatorial appointments and dismissals in Ukraine from 1996 to 2017. The results confirm that electoral performance was the primary driver of governor appointments during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma. In addition, it is demonstrated that various institutional conditions, such as party strength, the weak authority of the ruler within the central government, and regional polarization resulted in the adoption of different appointment strategies by subsequent presidents.
Working papers
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Why Do Pro-Russian Parties Flourish? Contextualizing the Rise of Ilan Șor’s Parties in Moldova. Under Review.
Russia’s use of hybrid strategies—combining disinformation, propaganda, and local political alliances—has become a defining feature of electoral interference in Europe. While existing research has focused on voter susceptibility and party responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, less attention has been paid to the local political mechanisms through which pro-Russian actors build durable support. This article examines the rise of political organizations linked to Ilan Șor in Moldova, a case in which pro-Russian mobilization has persisted. Drawing on expert interviews conducted in Moldova in 2024, the study traces the development of Șor’s network since 2016, focusing on two strategically important regions: Bălți and Găgăuzia. The article advances four main findings. First, Șor’s political success relies primarily on systematic vote buying and material inducements rather than ideology alone. Second, economic dissatisfaction under the pro-European PAS government created opportunities for short-term populist redistribution. Third, judicial exclusion strategies weakened Șor electorally but intensified polarization without addressing underlying pro-Russian grievances. Fourth, shifting strategies of the Socialist Party (PSRM) critically shaped both the expansion and contraction of Șor’s influence. By highlighting how local party competition mediates external influence, the article contributes to debates on pro-Russian parties, hybrid warfare, and subnational politics in Eastern Europe.
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Cadre Control and Coercion: How Centralized Appointments of Subnational Officials Intensify Judicial Repression. . Accepted at Comparative Politics.
Why do some subnational officials in authoritarian regimes initiate judicial repression against local elites? We theorize that political centralization intensifies subnational repression by altering the incentive structures of governors and prosecutors. Building on theories of cadre management and bureaucratic control, we argue that officials appointed and rotated by the central government face greater career incentives to pursue criminal cases against mayors. Using an original dataset of mayoral arrests in Russia (2000–2020), we find that mayors are more likely to face charges under appointed governors and outsider prosecutors. While outsider prosecutors selectively target vulnerable mayors, the different incentive structure makes governors repress broadly. These findings challenge top-down models of authoritarian coercion by showing how centralization facilitates repression from below. The study contributes to research on authoritarian institutions, subnational politics, and the bureaucratic foundations of state repression.
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Subnational Cadre Rotations for Centralization: Different Appointment Patterns of Outsider and Local Governors in Russia. Under Review.
How do autocrats recruit subnational officials? The extant literature asserts that authoritarian rulers allow longer tenures to loyal subnational officials who can mobilize voters in favor of regimes. This study argues that advancing centralization is another important motive for subnational cadre rotations. Although autocrats prefer to appoint loyal agents who conduct subnational policies in favor of the center, the threat of local elite rebellions forces autocrats to select local strongmen as their delegates. Exploiting the data on governor rotations in Russia, this study demonstrates that governors without local ties are more likely to be appointed in more democratic regions and regions with less popular leaders. By contrast, rotations of governors embedded in local communities are determined by the dominant party’s electoral performance. These findings contribute to an understanding of authoritarian subnational cadre rotations that seeks to enhance centralization while minimizing the possibility of regional instability.